Aviation safety is built on layers: procedures, training, technology, and redundancy. But sometimes—when those layers wear thin—tragedy breaks through.
In this episode of Miles to Go, I sit down with longtime friend and retired airline captain Les Abend to unpack the January midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport, a catastrophe that claimed 67 lives and shook confidence in a system long considered the gold standard for safety.
The recent NTSB investigative hearing was a sobering affair. Over the course of three days, the board outlined a series of systemic failures that contributed to the collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and a regional jet during approach. On paper, both aircraft were operating within the rules. But as we learned, those rules were not enough to prevent disaster.
Visual Separation—and Its Flaws
This crash happened under Visual Flight Rules (VFR)—a system that essentially boils down to "see and avoid." But that only works if both parties are actually able to see each other.
In this case, the Black Hawk crew was wearing night vision goggles (NVGs), a tool that enhances low-light visibility but comes with trade-offs: tunnel vision, loss of peripheral awareness, and overwhelming glare over brightly lit cities like Washington. Evidence suggests they may have mistaken another aircraft—or even a ground light—for the CRJ 700 they were told to avoid.
The jet, meanwhile, was executing a circle-to-land maneuver, common at Reagan as a way to squeeze in more arrivals and departures. The two aircraft were placed on paths just 75 feet apart vertically, a configuration with no margin for error if either pilot misjudged distance or misunderstood instructions.
And that’s exactly what happened.
Overworked Controllers and Ignored Warnings
Another critical failure point: air traffic control. That night, only one controller was assigned two frequencies for both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in that corridor. That controller admitted to being overwhelmed.
Even more damning, the FAA had been warned for years—by its own personnel—that this airspace configuration was dangerous. But instead of adjusting the helicopter routes or issuing new procedures, the agency let inertia win.
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy was blunt:
“Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium? Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead!”
This wasn’t just a one-off error. It was a failure of imagination and of bureaucracy.
Technology’s Missed Opportunity
One tool that could’ve helped? ADS-B, or Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast, transmits an aircraft’s GPS position and altitude on a frequency that allows other aircraft to see and avoid collisions.
But while commercial jets are required to carry ADS-B Out, military helicopters like the Black Hawk often don’t maintain operational security. Clearly, military aircraft training in this challenging air traffic environment should always be transmitting an ADS-B Out signal.
As Les and I discuss, this crash wasn’t about one bad call. It was a cascade of small, fixable problems that went unaddressed.
Air India Update
We also briefly discuss the ongoing investigation into Air India Flight 171—notably, the emerging consensus that both engines were intentionally shut down in flight, triggering a loss of control shortly after takeoff. This incident, while still under review, underscores how cockpit access and crew coordination remain critical vulnerabilities in modern aviation.
